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Ethnic politics and political violence in post-2001 Afghanistan: The 2014 
presidential election 
This article evaluates the political dynamics of 2014 presidential election to explore 
the sense of nationhood that could have formed in post-2001 Afghanistan and to 
gauge its strength. It examines frontrunner candidates—Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and 
Abdullah Abdullah’s—campaign rhetoric and processes they utilised to manipulate 
ethnic identities for political ends. Ethnic identities sharpened by ideological and 
political polarisation during the civil war (1978-2001), continue to play a critical part 
in the political economy dynamics of post-2001 era. With the popular patriotic idea 
of citizenship remaining weak, the abundance of ethnic identities provides a 
paradigm around which power contenders articulate their messages that easily feed 
into popular perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘other’. The article contextualises 
representative and consociational democracy exploring whether these models of 
democracy offer any solution to social cleavages in Afghanistan. It argues that elites’ 
manipulation of ethnic identities and distribution of resources through ethnic shares 
(Bonn Conference 2001, National Unity Government (NUG) 2014) might reinforce 
ethnic boundaries, leading to deeper consolidation of ethnic divisions.  
 Keywords: Political violence; ethnicity; identity; elections; ethnic-grievance. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to evaluate how Ghani (Pashtun) and 
Abdullah (Tajik) articulated their electoral narratives to manipulate ethnic markers to 
win votes in the 2014 presidential elections. CDA is used as ‘the general label for a 
special approach to the study of text and talk, emerging from critical linguistics, 
critical semiotics and in general from a socio-politically conscious and oppositional 
way of investigating language, discourse and communication’1 The article finds that in 
post-2001 years, elites are manipulating certain identity markers in their efforts to 
enhance their political power that effectively feeds into mass actions. The article 
focuses on the analysis of new empirical data and relevant literature on elite 
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behaviour and their implications for inter-communal interactions in Afghanistan where 
ethnicity, ethnic nationalism, and sub-national identity groups are fluid political 
forces. The article whilst going down the analytical road that takes up the relationship 
of ethnic representation to democracy, frames the main research question in relation 
to power struggles along ethno-regional ties and the likelihood of renewed political 
violence. It is, however, important to note that there are many contextual reasons 
why democratisation efforts in Afghanistan are failing. For instance, the intervention’s 
inability to foresee the political polarisation caused by a heavily centralised 
presidential system and heavy rent dependence of the Afghan polity leaves the 
recovery efforts prone to competition for different groups/pacts. This would not mean 
that political groups ‘naturally’ need to have trust—but in the Afghan case, distrust 
includes the state and its institutions. Each of these contextual aspects demands 
assessment in their own rights, which due to space limitation, falls beyond the scope 
of this article.   
The article is split into three main sections. The first section assesses how once 
blurred ethnic boundaries are consolidated after societal disputes and the way in 
which ethno-regional factions and elites manipulate them during and after transition 
processes. The second section presents key similarities and differences between 
representative and consociational democracy and their potential for addressing 
societal divisions in Afghanistan, pointing out structural and systemic problems playing 
out in the country. The third section assesses Ghani and Abdullah’s electoral 
narratives and bring in the conceptual insights on consociational and representative 
models of democracy to the interpretation of these discourses. The article suggests 
that in the face of international troop's drawdown, statebuilding project’s failure,2 
regional imperatives/geopolitics,3 and an unstable political economy, a more nuanced 
understanding of the dynamics of societal fabrics and their implications for instigating 
or mitigating political violence is imperative. A strong state cannot be established only 
through building institutions, central army and disarming armed spoilers but by 





There are three major methodological limits. 
• It is not always possible to exclude the coincidence possibility if a candidate 
receiving a similar number of votes as is the share of ‘his’ ethnic constituency 
in a given province.  
• Candidates’ behaviour when raising ethnic-sensitive issues may not necessarily 
and purposefully ‘ethnicise’ political discourse.  
• The reliability of data in an electoral context that is marred by large-scale 
fraud.  
Associating a candidate's narratives with ethnic ties alone is challenging when 
‘ethnicity, space, and politics’4 meet in a perplexed political economy dynamics 
including elections, which are contested in the absence of institutions that can 
regulate the rules of the game and help keep disorderly elites in check. However, in 
contexts that are marred by fragility and violent inter-ethnic experience, ethnic 
identities serve effective tool for winning influence. In the presidential elections of 
2004 and 2009, in every province where a candidate received 90% or more of the 
popular vote, these provinces consisted 90% or more of one ethnic group5—which 
persisted in the 2014 presidential elections.6 Excluding the coincidence possibility of a 
candidate receiving a similar number of votes as is the share of ‘his’ ethnic 
constituency in a given province, as well as establishing whether candidates raise 
issues with ethnic dimensions to ‘ethnicise’ political discourse and place one people 
against another may prove impossible. Similarly, when a certain percentage of a 
particular ethnic group in a given province and that percentage of voters casts their 
votes for a candidate does not necessarily mean that the candidate benefited from 
ethnic block voting. However, 90% of one region voting against 90% of another is a 
clear indication of curtains guarding against ethnic boundaries. Moreover, the contrast 
between vote counts Ghani received in 2009 (8% - on aggregate) and 2014 (over 90% on 
aggregate) in the same four provinces, might be interpreted as a strong indication of 
ethnic motivations. A close evaluation of subtexts framed within the broader electoral 
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discourse reveals the centrality of ethnicity in candidates’ campaigns as a tool to 
mobilise ethno-regional support. Another methodological problem is the reliability of 
such data in an environment marred by large-scale fraud. This article, however, in 
addition to using elections results seeks to mitigate the issue by using data from an 
Asia Foundation7 survey. It improves the reliability and confidence in the data by 
facilitating validation of data through cross verification from two different sources. 
Ethnicity in divided societies   
Ethnic identities and nationalism are dynamic—open and vulnerable to construction 
and manipulation—and have become a fluid political force at times of conflicts and 
tensions. In a society that is characterised by social and ethnic cleavages, ethnic 
identities gain in salience relative to other identities e.g. religious.8 In Afghanistan, 
after jihad evolved into civil wars the once blurred ethnic boundaries crystallised and 
became engrained in everyday practices.9 Ethnicity was increasingly used by warring 
factions to generate group cohesion to mobilise political support for a political 
position and against another.10 In post-Bonn era, ethnicity came to be one of key 
constituents of politics and communal engagement used by elites to map their social 
spaces or organise their social and political environment.11 Ethnicity continues to gain 
in salience as factions and networks continue to contest over control of the state. 
Ibrahimi argues that competition over control of state institutions, as in wartime or 
during intense electoral mobilisation, is likely to increase the communicative value of 
ethnic identity by creating an environment of pervasive uncertainty.12 In Afghanistan, 
state fragility accompanied by pervasive uncertainty has contributed to weakening the 
role of formal institutions—such as political parties and civil society, which are 
otherwise placed at the vanguard of organising and aggregating the interests and 
security of citizens across ethnic and other divides.13 Scholars have argued that where 
ethnic cleavages exist and power changes by non-democratic means, elites determine 
the characteristics and durability of political settlements.14 In essence, the structural 
capability of waging contests and the transformational attitudes of elites at times of 
turbulence can determine the stability and cohesiveness of patterns and sustainability 
of a society. The elite manipulation theory also argues that elites incite ethnic 
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violence for electoral gains,15 and exploit ethnic grievances as a rational and 
deliberate strategy to acquire or maintain political power and political support.16 
According to Snyder, one of key agencies for increased risk of nationalist conflict 
during democratisation processes such as elections is manipulation of ethnic cleavages 
for political purposes.17  
Social cleavages and preexisting features of political environment form key 
components of electoral systems, processes, and exigencies. Horowitz in identifying 
connections between ethnic mobilisation and the electoral system used in particular 
polities argues that no electoral system simply reflects voter preferences and existing 
patterns of cleavages in a society or the prevailing political party configuration, and 
that every electoral system shapes and reshapes these features.18. Numerous other 
studies, too, have highlighted the embedded and mutually reinforcing causes and 
outcomes between electoral systems, elections and societal cleavages.19 Thus—a 
complex nexus of interrelated factors, including security, corruption, political 
opportunism, and ethno-political cleavages stymies the effectiveness of electoral 
systems and encourage politicians to behave in a particular way that responds to 
overall electoral dynamics. In post-Bonn Afghanistan, ethno-political leaders and pacts 
have displayed a disproportionate influence within the political dynamics - an 
influence that reflects ethnic proportions. For instance, presidential elections of 2004, 
2009, and 2014 reveal how elites/ factions manipulated electoral landscapes along 
ethno-political grievances to win votes.20 Such behaviours could result in inter-ethnic 
immobilism, making it easier and exigent for political parties to limit themselves to 
ethno-regional supporters, and undermining inclusive engagement around a national 
agenda harder to crystallise. Thus, electoral outcomes are determined not just by the 
system, but by pre-existing patterns of social cleavages, whether single or multiple, 
polar or bipolar.21 The next section assesses key similarities and differences between 
representative and consociational democracy, pointing out how structural and 
systemic problems are playing out in Afghanistan and whether they could be addressed 
through different political systems.    
Ethnic Divisions and Democracy 
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We do not argue that ‘democracy’ is incompatible with ethnic group representation 
e.g. through political parties, other organisations or a grand coalition. We argue that 
in Afghanistan resorting to ethnic identities and sharing power through ethnic shares 
could further institutionalise ethnic fragmentations and risk the re-eruption of 
potential political violence. To contain violence in deeply divided societies, a range of 
models of democracy, including classical democracy, liberal democracy, direct 
democracy, and deliberative democracy have been tested and contrasted in different 
contexts (Held, 1996). Since we find consociational and representative democracy of a 
relatively clearer potential to adapt to the case of Afghanistan, we focus on the 
commonalities and differences of these two models and contextualise them within the 
broader Afghan political landscape and assess their application to the country.    
Representative and consociational democracy are praised for promoting peace 
and social cohesion in societies where ethnic and social cleavages are persistent. 
These forms of ‘Government’ promote the spirit of accommodation among the 
political elites, settle divisive issues where only a minimal consensus exists, facilitate 
multi-party systems, and bridge the gaps between mutually isolated blocs through 
effective representation.22 In contexts where conflicting elite pacts construct the 
dominant political ideology, manipulate historical narratives, and resort to conflicting 
ethnic consciousness and loyalties for instrumental purposes, representative and 
consociational democracy may mitigate social tensions. This is argued to be facilitated 
through enhanced participation in government by stimulating a ‘moderate attitude 
and a willingness to compromise’, and providing ‘an important guarantee of political 
security’ among parties and segments that ‘do not quite trust each other’.23         
****** Table to be inserted here *****  
Factionalism played out by ethno-regional elites became a key determinant of politics 
in Afghanistan after the communist-led coup in 1978 and manifested in inter-factional 
rivalry and violence.24 The ‘disorderly’ elite behaviours in Afghanistan have been key 
obstacles to reaching a political agreement25 capable of reproducing itself over time 
and building institutions supported by the general population and whose benefits are 
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consistent with the distribution of organisational power.26 Factionalism has led to the 
consolidation of closed social groupings and obstructed system openness to minority 
groups and smaller political parties. The absence of a multi-party system contributes 
to growing ethnic animosity of popular consciousness and political rhetoric. The major 
political parties in post-2001 Afghanistan (re)formed from the ashes of civil war which 
continues shaping their behaviours. This is—contrary to the constitution demanding 
them to be multi-ethnic. Rather these parties have merely ‘restructured’ to formally 
meet this requirement while remaining widely ethnic-based.27 This condition has 
rendered ineffective the possibility of accommodating conflicting preferences and 
forming an overriding goal. A multi-party system bears the prospect of lowering the 
walls of political mistrust and incompatibility that has persisted for long and stymied 
political parties to function along a national agenda in contrast to ethno-regional 
platforms. Few long-term national interests and incentives to hold political parties 
together exist. Political engagement through political parties under a multi-party 
system promotes competitive elections, creating more engaged voters over a longer 
period of time. A conducive environment for a wider party and non-party engagement 
also stimulates a moderate attitude amongst parties to cooperate with greater 
political interests and confidence.28 In ethnicised political systems group identities 
become more concrete and non-negotiable. Hence, disputes among identity groups 
based on their ethnicity are difficult to negotiate, raising the prospects of violence. 
Moreover, the low level of inclusiveness of the political system, explains why some 
countries such as Latin America have a higher incidence of civil wars.29        
The structural and systemic challenges that obstruct peace and stability in 
Afghanistan feed into the persistent majority/ minority divide that is being 
manipulated by ethno-regional political and military factions and elite pacts for 
instrumental purposes. The majority—minority tensions and struggle over state power 
and resources has rendered the governance system less advantageous in inviting and 
coordinating public political activity and participation. Moreover, allocating and 
equalising resources needed for forming political parties, access to representative 
forums, and opening them to politically excluded groups such as Sikhs and Hindus, 
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Balochs, and civil society (media) has been a bone of tensions between formal (state) 
and other institutions such as Taliban, insurgent groups and political parties. 
Instrumentalisation of identities in post-2001 era contributes to growing social 
fragmentation whereas ethnic manipulation and elite contestation over state power 
and resources have become co-constitutive elements of statebuilding efforts.30 Elites’ 
failure—manifested through presidential and parliamentary elections—to reach a 
political agreement capable of producing enduring partnership and spirit of 
cooperation in political, economic, and social practices, indicate that the country may 
not reach long-term stability soon.  
Another factor that tempts elites to manipulate ethnic identities and drives 
masses to mobilise down ethnic lines is fear of insecurity. People are much less likely 
to trust those outside their kinship groups, and much more likely to fear the ‘Other’ in 
times of insecurity. The idea of ‘ethnic security dilemma’31 appeals to groups with 
ethnic, religious, cultural, and lingual differences of greater or lesser cohesion when 
faced with ‘anarchy’ due to a state breakdown.32 Kühn argues that security dilemmas 
influence political behaviour in post-conflict peacebuilding.33 According to Kühn, in 
post-conflict years, risks from extinction to the transformation of a group’s socio-
political identity and/or of uncertainty about the other’s motives regarding expansion, 
control of sources of funding, or domination within the legal order of the ‘state’ shape 
interaction between social actors.34 Ethnic groups, despite lacking many of the 
attributes of statehood, may pay attention to the problem of security in the absence 
of a state. During the civil war 1979-2001, the key components of ethnic security 
dilemma e.g. fear of loss of group identity, fear of repression of ethnic tradition, fear 
of physical survival (ethnic cleansings) or prosperity of the community,35 were 
frequently referred to by different groups and resonated heavily amongst the 
population. In post-2001, despite the central state backed by foreign troops to ensure 
citizens' security, the elements of fear over perceived or real insecurity and politico-
economic marginalisation of ethnic groups that constitutes a ‘perceptual security 
dilemma’,36 continues to endure. This fear affects relations among groups and 
undermines inter-group trust.  
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Economically, historical contingence played a central role in warfare and 
influence transitional processes.37 To contextualise the dynamics of conflict and to 
reach an effective peace settlement, it is important to consider the political economy 
of armed intra-state war. Moreover, the actors/factions that struggled over power and 
resources during wars seek to consolidate their power in post-conflict situation, by 
expanding control over the local economic and political processes.38 In Afghanistan, 
when the state collapsed and civil war ensued, trade in lucrative natural resources, 
narco-economy, the traditional means of pillage and plunder, diaspora remittances, 
and the capture of foreign aid constituted critical sources of wars self-financing. In 
post-2001 era, these ‘resource wars’39 continue to serve the interests of the conflict 
profiteers to keep the wars alight and to provide a leverage to strike deals.40 Political 
economy allows tackling the puzzle of why ethnicity, which is often profoundly 
divisive during elections, coexist with distinct groups forming inter-ethnic alliances 
during elections in Afghanistan. Although inter-ethnic alliances have a long history, 
the present levels and functional imperatives closely derive from contemporary 
political-economic dynamics. Ethno-regional leaders since the communist coup have 
sought to secure shares in state power in order to tap into resources to enrich 
themselves and to serve the interests of their co-ethnic ‘micro-societies’.41  
The challenge of mistrust and conflicting political agendas amongst political 
parties could be addressed through introducing a multi-party system, where political 
parties trust each other and help democratisation processes succeed. However, 
appreciating the idea that generating trust through a system that works to produce it 
over time rather than requiring it at the outset is a critical step. The country’s 
turbulent history attributed to external interventions and domestic actors’ inability to 
form a consolidated national agenda has reduced the possibility of inclusive parties 
coming into formation and reaching the desired level of maturity. Rather political 
interactions and negotiations amongst factions/parties and alliances have formed out 
of short-sighted incentives. Representative parties play a critical part in promoting 
inclusive politics. Through promoting civic participation, political parties serve as a 
point of reference for voters and offer direction to government.42 Tainted inter-group 
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relations have halted the consolidation of basic infrastructure of political engagement 
and communal trust—once established, however, the basics of common interests, 
trust, national solidarity, and overarching loyalties to national institutions are 
simultaneously formed. The political systems tested so far have failed to serve as a 
tool to wedge belligerent parties and masses along a mutually respected cross-
community platform for activities and interactions. Developing a political system 
capable of creating and supporting a shared platform for inter-communal participation 
has the potential to afford opportunities for all segments of a plural society, including 
excluded ones who will have the space to develop a sense of loyalty to national 
interests and reduce the appeal of ethnic affiliations. It is only then that a landscape 
that has the power of unifying and connecting (through friction or concurrence) the 
‘fluctuating’ ‘atomic units’ of a society by projecting citizens into a future-oriented 
perspective.43  
In the remainder of this section—using discourse analysis—we assess how the 
two leading candidates employed ethnic-centric narratives articulated around a 
language of ethnic pride to position themselves temporarily and spatially within the 
overall electoral atmosphere. A close analysis of these narratives reveals the 
centrality of ethnicity in political discourses and behaviours in post-2001 contexts. In 
interviews with authors during the elections, the two candidates’ aides explained how 
the processes of manipulation of identity in the 2014 presidential elections remained 
at the epicentre of electoral agenda:  
Both candidates refrained from an explicit deployment of ethnic-
centric politics but did resort to it indirectly when and as needed. The 
candidates and their team members would consider their ethno-
regional constituencies their winning-cards.44 
Although it appears an outmoded practice with a racist overtone to 
publicly resort to identity politics in campaign narratives, but in 
Afghanistan’s current context, no candidate would ignore it. It is vote-
winning magic.45  
11 
 
The Ghani-Abdullah Narratives 
During the 2014 presidential election, Ghani presented his programmes around five 
themes: (i) stability and security; (ii) good governance and reform; (iii) justice and 
participation; (iv) foreign policy; and (v) economic growth and welfare. An analysis of 
the sub-texts associated with these themes reveals the prevalence of an ethno-
regional dimension in the majority of these programmes. In essence, ‘specific 
messages’ were projected at ‘specific audience’ through electoral slogans printed on 
large billboards and brochures circulated nationwide. The slogans included, ‘social 
justice and social inclusion’, ‘no citizen will be superior to another citizen’, ‘no 
province will be grades 1, 2, 3 any longer’, and ‘freeing the Hazarajat from the 
natural prison’. These slogans targeted specific segments of electorates in specific 
locations. A senior aide to Ghani suggested:  
The most difficult task in developing contents for electoral agenda was to 
reconcile the conflictive demands most often erected on ethnic grounds.46  
An Uzbek senior aide to Ghani stated that such slogans transmitted a message to 
Hazara and Uzbek voters who have been long deliberately disadvantaged by the 
Pashtun dynasty:   
Addressing and engaging with concerns sensitive to Uzbeks and Hazaras is of 
critical significance if we are to win the election, as turnout is high in these 
communities and are inclined to vote largely for their co-ethnic leaders. So it is 
an effective strategy to mobilise such communities.47  
An independent scholar in Kabul argued that it was possible to ascertain a certain 
degree of organisational effort and strategic deliberation premised on identity politics 
across the electoral discourses, which accounted for the radicalisation of ethnic claims 
and could turn from ethnic mobilisation to ethnic tensions. He lamented:  
The tactics of mobilising electorates along ethnic ties can be easily 
contextualised as memories of inter-communal conflicts can tear open the 
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wounds and readily translate into actions and reactions of those grieved by the 
‘other’.48  
Abdullah was appointed foreign minister at the Bonn conference and was 
removed by Hamid Karzai in 2006. Eventually, Abdullah turned Karzai’s tenacious 
critic accusing him of excluding other factions, particularly Jamiat—(Tajik-dominated) 
and its military wing—Shura-e-Nezar. Abdullah formed the National Front opposition 
and challenged the incumbent Karzai in 2009 presidential election, finishing second 
with 30.60% of votes. Mohammad Mohaqqiq, a leader of the Hazara ethnic group who 
ran in the 2004 presidential election and finished third, supported Karzai in 2009 and 
would later become a Karzai critic upon his failure to deliver on his electoral 
promises. To justify his opposition to Karzai after supporting him during the 2009 
election, Mohaqqiq adopted a narrative of ethnic bearings and called Karzai ‘a 
president who gave his qawm preferential treatments and placed his ethno-regional 
clients' interests above those of all other ethnic communities’.49 In another TV talk, 
Mohaqqiq again accused Karzai of being a pro-Pashtun president arguing:  
When the Kuchis [nomads] mingled with their co-ethnic Taliban militias and 
descended onto the Hazara lands and pastures each spring and cause untold 
sorrows to the lives of poor and ordinary Hazaras, I persistently ask Karzai to 
prevent it, but he does nothing. Because he has more sympathy with nomads 
and Taliban who are armed terrorists and less sympathy for the Hazaras despite 
their peacefulness and support for the central government.50  
In 2014 elections, Mohaqqiq ran as Abdullah’s second deputy and his support 
proved critical to Abdullah’s electoral success. In the remainder of this section, we 
evaluate the candidates’ narratives around major themes, which they deployed to 
consolidate ethno-regional support.    
Ethnic grievances  
The Ghani camp tended to exploit the Pashtun communities resentful of changing 
power structures they claim to have damaged the grandeur and political hegemony 
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they traditionally held since the foundation of Afghanistan in 1747. Ghani's electoral 
narratives were interpreted to have transformed a technocrat to a populist Afghan.51 
During a campaign trip to Kandahar on 28 March 2014, Ghani boasted about his role in 
securing the release of Taliban prisoners from Bagram Airbase prison. This claim is 
bold even by Afghan standards and echoes his appreciation of how ethnic and factional 
appeals have played a deadly role in Afghan power politics. In this electoral speech, 
Ghani went a step further and stated ‘… we will release more of these [Taliban] 
prisoners … and will not allow prisoners to be used as a business commodity'.52 The 
ethnic dimension of popular perceptions and elites’ identity-driven practices became 
more blatant when the first-round results failed to produce a winner and a prolonged 
popular support was needed. Ghani’s camp frustrated at their poor performance in 
Hazara dominated regions in the first round was compelled to recalibrate its campaign 
strategy.53 Hence, Ghani's camp developed fresh strategy that explicitly addressed the 
issues that were of particular concerns to Hazaras such as economic investment and 
construction of highways and dams in Hazarajat and permanent resolution of the 
Kuchi-Hazara land/pasture disputes. These slogans were printed on large billboards 
and displayed in Hazara-populated areas.54 
Abdullah’s team on 2 February 2014—the first day of the official campaign 
period—organised a large gathering in Kabul. Abdullah and his deputies demonstrated 
a clear ethno-regional frustration attributed to their political and economic 
marginalisation by the Pashtun-dominated government. Abdullah’s narratives were 
primarily underpinned by this sense of marginalisation and his electoral discourses 
were premised on the ideas of ‘undoing wrongs’, ‘putting an end to social injustice’, 
and ‘ending the systematic exclusion of the mujahedeen who fought the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda.’55 Abdullah merely departed from his 2009 presidential election campaign 
narratives, stating: 
The people who freed the country from the Soviets and led the war on 
terror [Taliban] have been marginalised. You will see a bright future in 
which every citizen will have an equal opportunity. The era of injustices 
and hegemonic control of the state by a single network will be brought to 
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an end.  
Abdullah’s narratives were supplemented by his running-mate Mohaqqiq, whose 
speech more clearly showed the exposure of politics to identity and ethno-regional 
politics:   
The tradition of a ‘Big Brother’ style control and the single-network 
monopoly over power and ‘national’ resources will change. The 
practice of awarding the contracts worth billions of dollars to one 
network and one family will end. The tradition of over-allocating 
budget to some provinces [Pashtun-dominated] and depriving others 
[non-Pashtuns dominated] will be altered.                  
Ethnic polarisation persists not only at elite level, endures in other institutions and 
public venues, too. On 19 January 2015, when parliament passed a vote of no 
confidence for all Hazara and Uzbek ministerial-nominees, there was a fear amongst 
elites and media that old ethnic solidarities would be reinvigorated. A Hazara MP 
expressed this fear arguing ‘a collective refusal of nominees of particular ethnic 
groups [Hazaras and Uzbeks] is a clear indication of ethnic discrimination. This causes 
an ethnic agony that could hamper the prospects of national cohesion.’56  
Regional divides   
The Ghani-Dostum ticket did not perform as expected in Uzbek-Turkmen regions and 
culminated in a fierce anxiety.57 According to an Uzbek MP, the significance of the 
Uzbek-Turkmen ‘vote pact’ forced the team to change its strategy and develop new 
messages designed in a way that would arouse the Turkic communities’ sense of being 
awarded more significance in the future.58 In this process, the Uzbek-Turkmen were 
promised that their regions due to their strategic location as a corridor to Central 
Asian countries would be allocated more resources and would be converted to the 
gateway to regional trade and commerce that would enhance their economy and 
empower their peoples.59 A senior Junbish-e-Milli party member and senior aide to 
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Ghani explained how his team targeted and mobilised electorates along ethno-regional 
concerns:  
Election in Afghanistan is a complex yet sensitive issue and is not a 
reflection of complete nationhood. The candidates find it hard to 
penetrate other ethnic groups’ territories on their own. That is why they 
enter alliances with people who they might not necessarily find 
convenient, and are forced to succumb to political marriage. However, 
there are some signs that inter-group tolerance is growing—albeit slowly. 
Even elites who once denounced each other are forging inter-group 
alliances.60          
Rashid Dostum, Ghani’s first vice-president went even further condemning his Uzbek-
Turkmen brethren to treachery if they failed to vote for him. ‘If you all, Turkic men 
and women do not vote for me, you have committed treason to your history.’61 On the 
day he registered for electoral contest, Dostum bluntly disclosed the pertinacity of 
ethnic divides that threatened the country, claiming ‘had I joined Abdullah, we would 
have been the uncontested winner, but it would have also led the country into north-
south disintegration.’62  
Abdullah’s supporters in the run-off campaigns when the Ghani-Abdullah 
confrontations reached an unprecedented height organised a large gathering in Herat 
province, considered a power centre for Tajiks. Addressing the rally, Abdullah 
repeatedly stated that ‘to continue their monopoly on power, they [Pashtuns] have 
invented mass fraudulent votes. But we [non-Pashtuns] will break this cycle of power 
monopoly and deliver our peoples the rights they have endured so much pain for’.63 
Abdullah further claimed that ‘a calculated regional pride and prejudice in 
distribution of development aid and promotion of investment’ guided governance in 
the Karzai administration. Abdullah also argued, ‘some provinces better connected to 
Karzai received disproportional privilege compared to others’. This narrative 
demonstrates that there are visible and invisible sub/national associations of solidarity 
bound together by ethnic kinship and are instrumental to winning votes that 
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candidates cannot afford to ignore. A Tajik MP expressed his team’s frustration over 
the alleged attempts by the Pashtuns to curb Tajiks’ presence in power in similar 
rhetoric to that of Abdullah:  
The Pashtuns have ruled and unleashed a monopoly over political, military 
and economic resources at the expense of other people's [ethnic groups]. 
They [Pashtuns] cannot tolerate others in power who have equally 
sacrificed for this country. For the past three years, the recruitment of 
conscripts from Tajik-dominated regions into security sector is officially 
curtailed on the order of President Karzai and his affiliates.64  
In essence, with the growth in prevalence of ethnic rhetoric in electoral discourses, 
the candidates’ electoral discourses and rhetoric were increasingly taking a sense of 
ethnic pride/chauvinism, indicating a real danger that elections could turn into ethnic 
violence and widen regional divides. In assessing the centrality of ethnicity in 
electoral narratives and behaviours in the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan, 
Sahar argues that ‘Abdullah’s strategy to reach out to voters hardly extended beyond 
the jihad and resistance against the Taliban, and the history, conquest, and victories 
which the Afghans take pride in were seldom referred to’.65 The Crisis Group also 
raised concerns over increasing ethnic violence in the contexts of Jamiat-Junbesh and 
Tajik-Pashtun confrontations in the north and northeast and warned that the violence 
could escalate further in future.66   
Historical narratives of jihad   
Ghani, while acted as a technocrat and claimed to present a programme-centred 
rather than identity-centred policy, he could hardly escape the popular appeal 
historical narratives pertaining to civil war [foremost fought along ethno-regional ties] 
carried in mobilising support. Amongst other instances is Ghani’s declination to easily 
let go of the manipulated sense of ethnicity’s binding effects in the ‘terminology’ he 
used during his press conferences and televised debates. In a televised speech on 14 
June 2014, Ghani declared himself ‘the candidate of the nation’, whilst downgrading 
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Abdullah to ‘the candidate of the Jamiat-e-Islami’. Earlier, Ghani had invoked similar 
spirit of ethno-regional divides contested in the context of civil war stating ‘I am not 
the product of the civil war era. My hands are clean. I have inflicted harm upon no 
one.’67  
Ghani meticulously chose the terms that implied identity politics. The civil wars 
are popularly understood to have been, firstly by Pashtuns, as attempt to restore past 
hegemonic dominance disturbed by the communist coup in 1978 and mujahedeen’s 
ascent to power in 1992. Historically, since 1747 when Afghanistan was founded, there 
have only ever been two non-Pashtun leaders in power (January – October 1929 and 
1992-6). Secondly, other ethnic groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras) view these wars as 
struggles to consolidate adequate representation. Deploying such narratives helped 
Ghani disassociate from the civil war in which Abdullah’s jihadi Jamiat-e-Islami party 
is generally viewed as the key perpetrator. The Rabbani government (1992-96) and its  
hegemonic control of the state apparatus is considered by other ethnic groups a 
period of unmitigated despair during which various parties/factions battered each 
other at hideous costs to the civilian population.68 The Tajik domination of key state 
institutions in the immediate aftermath of post-2001 development culminated in a 
sense of frustration amongst the more hard-line Pashtuns.69 Moreover, Jamiat and 
Shura-e-Nezar are accused by these hard-liners of targeting and abusing the 
Pashtuns.70 This sense of ethnic grievances in the absence of a collectively accepted 
patriotic idea of nationhood and a rigorous political logic has the potential to turn the 
tide for political entrepreneurs.71 As such, it was viewed that despite distancing 
himself from jihad years, Ghani negotiated the co-optation of mujahedeen to wield 
support—in a ‘strategic move’ to portray a more inclusive picture of his electoral team 
and to utilise the social capital the mujahedeen leaders/commanders leveraged in 
their respective ethno-regional networks and communities.72 Thus—Ghani consistently 
promised an accommodation of mujahedeen factions into political arrangements post-
election and the rejuvenation of the status they deserved because of their role in the 
jihad and resisting the Taliban. This slogan largely targeted the Tajik disgruntled 
factions which felt ‘excluded’ by Karzai after his election to presidency in 2004.73        
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Similar to Ghani, Abdullah also resorted to jihad narratives to influence 
electorates. In Afghanistan, the Af-Soviet war (1978-1992) resonates widely within the 
general public, due to its ideological [religious] underpinnings and remains one of the 
common denominators with which the Afghans collectively identify. Hence, all jihadi 
factions take great sense of pride in their victory over the Soviets. The non-Pashtun 
factions claim additional pride and popular support—because of their contribution to 
defeating the Taliban in post-9/11 US-led intervention in Afghanistan. These factions 
have persistently highlighted this issue and, when needed, have used it as a tool to 
mobilise ethnic sentiment and support. Abdullah on his ballot paper declared himself 
as Jamiat-e-Islami party’s candidate, and throughout his campaigns, Abdullah kept 
resorting to his party’s role in jihad, in leading the resistance against the Taliban, and 
its subsequent exclusion from power. On 28 March 2014 in a campaign rally in Mazaar-
e-Sharif, Abdullah said:  
The mujahedeen factions [referring to Jamiat] that led the jihad 
against the Soviets to victory and defeated the terrorists [Taliban] have 
been denied their rights. We will return the glory days to mujahedeen.   
After a protracted recount of ballots and eventual political settlement between Ghani 
and Abdullah, heavily pressured by the U.S., NUG was created. This arrangement of 
co-governing trapped Ghani and Abdullah in a difficult situation of having to reconcile 
their differences and manage their promises. However, this practice of negotiation 
and compromise over state power and resources led to further political divides 
between the two camps. According to Hazara MP: 
NUG has become a battle ground where different ethno-regional 
clients affiliated with President and the CEO compete over offices 
they were promised during elections. President and CEO try to appoint 
their men to strategic posts where their interests are best served.74  
The centrality of ethnicity is evident in candidates’ use of particular symbols, 
language and imagery deployed around the multi-ethnic Kabul and other major cities 
19 
 
to motivate electorates outside of the capital’s elite circles. Both Ghani and Abdullah 
used a variety of these symbols, including hat, turban and chapan—adorned with 
intricate threading and worn mainly by Uzbeks on celebration or special occasions. 
Ghani’s pictures in Hazara and Uzbek dominated areas were shown with Hazaragi 
turban and Uzbek chapan, while in Pashtun-populated areas (capital and provinces), 
he wore turban. Of more contrast is Abdullah’s deployment of ethnic symbols. In the 
Tajik-dominated areas, he wore Pakol hat and tied a shawl around his neck—which 
became the symbol of Tajik factions during civil war and resistance against Taliban—
while on campaign trails to Pashtun-dominated areas, he wore certain types of turban 
and shalwar kamiz clothes often conceived cultural symbols of these regions. This 
discourse highlights an explicit attempt by candidates to appeal to ethno-regional 
electorates, while—simultaneously playing national unity. This approach makes it hard 
to conclude based on the rhetoric of election itself that deep factional differences 
drive politics. However, election results demonstrate a clearer picture of the nature 
of factional politics at a local level, suggesting the country is divided along ethno-
regional ties. While Ghani-Dostum (Figure1) ticket won most of the Pashtun and 
outright majority Uzbek votes, Abdullah won most of the Tajik votes in the North. The 
Hazara powerful leader—Mohaqqeq—won most of the votes in the Hazara-dominated 
provinces of Dai Kundi and Bamyan. Comparing Ghani’s vote counts in 2009 with 
2014—although may not necessarily indicate a direct indication of rampant block 
voting along ethnic ties, as there were totally different elections with different sets of 
candidates, provides a strong indication of ethnic sentiments during times of power 
struggles.  
 
****** Figures to be inserted here ****** 
However, Ghani’s win of the most of Pashtun votes—despite his prominent southerner 
rivals in the first round—including Zalmai Rasul and Gul Agha Sherzai supporting 
Abdullah in the second round—without doing something spectacular, can be a strong 
indication of ethnic cleavages at local level. Moreover, electoral discourses were not 
confined to rival camps, rather were significantly reflected in local media, which is 
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assessed in the next sub-section.     
Local media reflections  
Taking a glance at media headlines, columns, and editorials, easily revealed their 
affiliations with a particular candidate. The media coverage of election heated along 
ethno-political lines increasingly when the first round failed to produce a winner and 
the contest spiralled into near-violent confrontation. On 21 June 2014, Pajhwok daily 
published a column warning that ‘the media must not violate the principles of 
independent and neutral journalism in the heat of elections’.75 The majority of the 
local media during the elections took strong ‘ethnic pigmentation.’76 On 22 June 2014, 
the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) fined 14 TV channels with large sums for 
failing to adhere to the chart of conduct. The IEC, however, also appreciated media, 
which took independent and neutral positions. Some independent newspapers while 
providing a balanced coverage to elections warned that the contesters and their 
supporters increasingly politicised ethnic identities for political purposes. The editor 
of a newspaper in Kabul explained how the local media were drawn into ethno-
regional networks of solidarity out of political and economic incentives during the 
presidential elections in 2014:  
The majority of local media acted politically and became bed-fellows with 
powerful and rich candidates out of various incentives. These media outlets 
received significant political and financial support and some media proprietors 
were promised offices in post-election arrangements. I believe, in return these 
media outlets played a critical part in influencing the electoral dynamics in 
favour of their patronage. For instance, Tolo Network as the largest and the 
most influential media in Afghanistan transformed the electoral landscape in 
favour of Ghani.77  
Similar perceptions on political stance media took on election were reflected by a 
media watchdog from the National Democratic Institute-Afghanistan that monitored 
media coverage of election campaigns. The watchdog argued that 'most of the media 
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associated with contesting factions took an ethno-political stance on election and 
their coverage was overwhelmingly biased, demonstrating a chauvinistic 
characteristic.'78 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) assessing the media in 
Afghanistan reported that the media are not fulfilling their potential as a means to 
help Afghanistan transition peacefully out of conflict.79 Other studies that assess the 
processes politicians have been utilizing media in post-2001 context to influence local 
and social sources of power suggest that powerful ex-warlords and foes to expand 
their influence and maintain their grip on power have appropriated much of Afghan 
media.80 The case of Afghanistan illustrates that in a context where social cleavages 
continue to grow, the media could be co-opted and manipulated as a tool for further 
promoting ethnic and social distinctions. It could be further stated that the ‘warlords’ 
and ‘strongmen’, who are conceiving the seizure of power infeasible militarily, have 
resorted to the media to leverage propaganda to build influence and public support. In 
this process, the media sector is viewed to provide a new platform for the powerful—
and those seeking more power – to consolidate their positions.81 Aware of this 
significance, ethnic and religious leaders are using the media to influence public 
opinion in favour of narrower and more conservative agendas.82 Hence, many 
influential political figures from all ethnic groups run their own media outlets—
including TV channels and papers—advocating their own agenda. There is a strong 
relation between political stability and media landscape in a divided context. Whilst 
affording an opportunity to shape ideas and consolidate democratisation processes, 
the media can provide a platform for belligerent groups to reduce the enemy image, 
generate mistrust and ethic security dilemma.   
What is missing and ought to be changed?  
In the current perplexed context of Afghanistan, ensuring elections to reflect 
citizens’ will is a lofty aim and remains elusive. The failure of the current political 
system to address both visible (shattered infrastructures, maimed civilians) and 
invisible (collapse of state efficacy, mistrust in government, pervasive fear) impact of 
the protracted conflict calls for alternatives premised on the entry that brings in new 
ideas and breeds aptitude and collective inclusion. Whilst developing this alternative 
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is an arduous task that requires patience and skills, exploring other possibilities that 
reflect the historical context of Afghanistan proffers a potential opportunity. In this 
process, certain things ought to be changed to respond to the dynamics of social 
polarisation.  
First, the international post-2001 intervention must transcend the procedural-
political reforms and sheer technical underpinnings and rather address the features of 
the political system that allow and have allowed non-democratic regimes to act as a 
façade of democracy amid deficiencies in popular sovereignty, growing corruption and 
lawlessness. As such, the intervention should mitigate the bias within the political 
system (discrimination against ethnic minorities and social groups) that has historically 
benefited anti-democratic, corrupt oligarchic ruling elites and dynastic power 
monopolisers that violate the constitution’s democratic provisions with impunity. 
Curbing on elective positions as a means of consolidation of clan and ethno-regional 
networks of solidarity would foreclose the prospects of ethno-centric and widen those 
of wider political participation and electoral competition. Regarding elections and 
their implications for political stability, institutional efficacy in electoral management 
bodies ‘can determine whether an election is a source of peaceful change or a cause 
for serious instability’.83 Hence, electoral reforms undertaken by the international 
community should ensure election commissions’ independence and develop their 
capability and tenacity to ensure credible elections. Strong and effective institutions 
might discourage elite pacts and ethno-regional factions/parties to negotiate and 
compromise over state power and resources on their own terms and rather promote 
mutual trust amongst the ethnic groups and mitigate social cleavages. In other similar 
contexts, it is argued that while the performance of election-related institutions—
particularly the election commissions—was a fundamental reason for the debacle that 
unfolded in post-2007 elections in Kenya84, it largely entrenched the popular 
confidence in elections in Nigeria.85  
Second, the political reforms currently underway must include a robust 
partnership between the state institutions, civil society, and the private sector that 
owns and supports local media. Since a major cost of internal violent conflict is the 
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loss of community cohesion, and conflict has shown,86 for instance in Liberia, to ‘have 
broken community and familial relationships and laid waste to the trust in institutions 
deemed essential to the recovery process.’87 Similarly, the people in eastern DRC have 
been described ‘as disempowered, marginalised, and impoverished... [with an] 
absence of viable local government and related services and infrastructure...The 
result is isolated, fragile communities among some of the poorest in the world, who 
lack basic services and the social cohesion and capital necessary to mobilise local 
human and physical resources to meet their own needs.’88 These communities whilst 
remaining prone to manipulation by predatory actors can be empowered through 
inclusion in national programmes to trigger a sense of ownership and confidence and 
enable them to behave in a way that benefits the wider community such as voting a 
candidate who offers broad-based agenda and transcends narrow ethno-regional 
interests. As discussed in the previous sections, whilst partnership overlaps with 
ethnicity in Afghanistan, it has been heeded little and its significance in improving the 
quality and extent of participation at the local level has largely been ignored. 
Moreover, since the Afghan conceptions of political integrity and equitability are 
deeply grounded in contextual experiences with ethno-political violence, a sustained 
inclusion of the relevant stakeholders in particular activities, including elections may 
mitigate the trust deficit in the state and build a national identity that supersedes 
ethnic and local identities.  
Third, to achieve a relative degree of political stability, it is critical to 
undermine the social roots of the political elites who are shown to occupy strategic 
positions in the state and influence the formation and functioning of the state.89 A 
measure that could potentially help realise this aim is the promotion of a multi-party 
system to encourage political parties to function in collaboration with each other and 
communicate their agenda to cross-ethnic constituents. Given the inability of the 
centralised political system at the expense of a multi-party system to ensure stability 
in Afghanistan, the development of broad-based political institutions such as inclusive 
political parties and strong parliament must be supported as key elements of political 
system. The international partners in Afghanistan are best placed to encourage and 
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assist—financially and technically—the political parties to recruit from different 
communities and should help these parties develop the contextually specific 
infrastructures needed for this engagement. Moreover, the Afghan government and 
relevant institutions such as the Ministry of Justice whilst encouraging political parties 
to outreach broader segments of the society, should strictly monitor their activities 
and if necessary, must hold them to account for irregularities identified in their 
agenda. Moreover, the assistance (political and technical) provided to the Afghan 
state by the international donors must include a support for multi-party system and 
condition the Afghan government to respect and facilitate the inclusion of political 
parties in national politics. This approach would halt partisan parties from offering 
multiple political interpretations of inter-ethnic grievances and change the political 
behaviours that view institutions not as sovereign authorities in themselves but as 
means of mustering personal and group agendas. In Afghanistan, a political system 
might work better that promotes open ethnic frontiers and communications and yields 
confidence in the state, and builds citizenship bound together by horizontal relations 
of reciprocity and cooperation and not by vertical relations of authority and 
dependency. 
    
CONCLUSION 
This article analyses the underlying political and socio-economic institutional 
foundations that breed and entrench ethnic polarisation in the political processes in 
Afghanistan. It assessed how ethnic narratives have fluctuated in strength and 
importance, usually aligned with levels of insecurity, distribution of state power and 
resources and group representation after the 1978 coup. Because of the legacies of 
inter-ethnic wars, particularly the civil wars in the 1990s, ethnicity in the post-2001 
reconstruction experiment remains a politically sensitive issue. The article suggests 
that the patriotic idea of nationhood and the sense of belonging to a consensually 
accepted overarching national identity amongst the Afghans is still weak. The 2014-
presidential election was considered a historic day for the troubled nation to 
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experience the first democratic transfer of power from one elected president to 
another. However, the election was marred by large-scale fraud and Ghani was named 
president without the final output of a vote re-count was released and only after a 
political and extra-constitutional deal was struck with his rival to share power. The 
article finds that election patterns and the subsequent turmoil over results indicate 
deep ethnic divides and threaten the democratisation processes. While Abdullah’s 
team was overwhelmingly Tajik with considerable support from Mohaqqiq’s Hazara 
powerful party, Ghani’s team appeared with heavy Pashtun and Uzbek characteristics. 
This ethnic revulsion on the part of one group against another group is endemic, 
voting patterns ethnically pigmented, and reflects ethnic loyalties and a kind of 
communal consensus on ethnicity. The elites’ behaviours and political entrepreneurs’ 
predatory approach of arousing the emotive grievance-laden legacies of inter-group 
living memories and experience remind that the road to overcoming the pervasive 
ethnic fractures is bumpy and long. The article suggested that political practices and 
systems through which popular interests are translated into policy, individuals are 
able to develop civic awareness, and community solidarity is promoted must 
substitute ethno-regional politics. In post-conflict contexts, a political system that 
allows all segments to patriciate in decision-making processes and distributes power 
and resources fairly is key to stability. In Afghanistan, intrastate and ethnically-based 
conflicts have their roots in unjust political system in which ethnic identity has been a 
marker of difference and antagonism that privileges some over others. Post-war 
politics should function based on compromise and tolerance and should be a substitute 
for factional and partisan political practices. The article concluded that the growing 
ethnic cleavages that undermine political stability in post-2001 Afghanistan might be 
addressed through representative or consociational models of political system.   
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